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Abstract: The global governance of development increasingly relies on multi-stakeholder partnerships 
between states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This article 
takes on two tasks. The first is to describe quantitatively the institutional evolution of the multilateral 
development system over the past century. The second is to juxtapose four rational-institutionalist 
explanations for why states establish new organizations as transnational governance initiatives—
functionalism, power-oriented theories, domestic politics, and contextual design. The empirical 
analysis probes these explanations using the new Transnational Governance Initiatives in World 
Politics dataset, which combines several existing data sources to build the most comprehensive data on 
forms of institutionalized cooperation in global governance. The results lend most support to the 
contextual design view, while also yielding support for other accounts. By employing Heckman 
selection models, the analysis addresses potential selection bias due to unobserved correlation between 
state choices to create a new organization and its design. A qualitative case study further validates 
measurement choices and causal mechanisms. These findings have implications for theories of 
institutional design and development practice, specifically regarding the role of intergovernmental 
organizations in an increasingly interconnected world. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1998, health experts from the World Health Organization (WHO) called upon foreign aid 
donors to mobilize a massive effort to tackle infectious diseases. The G-8 pledged to take 
action on this call at their Okinawa summit, and mandated a transitional working group at the 
subsequent G-8 summit in Genoa to devise an institutional structure that would help them 
fulfill their pledge.2 Most donor countries were reluctant to create a new organization, but 
they also doubted that the United Nations (UN) system would be able to manage a major 
increase in foreign aid for tackling infectious diseases. Hence, donor countries decided that 
the new institution would be a “partnership between governments, civil society, the private 
sector, and people affected by the diseases.”3 They called upon other countries, private 
foundations, and academic institutions to join with financial resources, in-kind contributions, 
and shared expertise. On January 28, 2002, donors approved the framework document of a 
new “Global Fund” tackling three burdensome diseases—HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria. The organization has since become a key player in global public health. When its 
secretariat took up operations in early 2002, the Global Fund had already received about USD 
2 billion in pledges.4 
The institutional structure of the Global Fund differs markedly from previous 
intergovernmental organizations addressing development challenges. The Global Fund was 
established not by international treaty but as a foundation under Swiss law and endowed 
subsequently with international privileges. And yet, it resembles formal intergovernmental 
organizations such as the WHO, as it has an independent secretariat, a governing board, and 
legal personality (Clarke 2014). In contrast, unlike the WHO, its governing board includes 
non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); finally, it describes itself as “a 
financing institution [... that does] not implement programs on the ground.”5 Its comparative 
advantage is stakeholder mobilization. As one donor official said, the Global Fund 
“undeniably achieved more media coverage than what would have been possible […] through 
traditional channels.”6 To implement its programs though, the Global Fund relies primarily on 
the established multilaterals and their country support structures, for example WHO, 
UNICEF, or the World Bank. In light of these particular features, which reflect a departure 
from the prototypical model of formalized inter-state cooperation, the Global Fund is best 
described as a transnational public-private governance initiative (TGI). 
In this article, we take on two tasks. First, we exploit a new dataset to describe quantitatively 
the institutional evolution of the multilateral development system since its inception. This 
allows us to elucidate the prevalence of new models of institutionalized cooperation in 
development and when such new institutions superseded traditional forms of 
intergovernmental cooperation. The data show that for a long time, development cooperation 
                                                          
2 http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm (Accessed October 5, 2016). 
3 www.theglobalfund.org/en/overview/ (Accessed October 5, 2016). 
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/19/opinion/stinginess-on-
aids.html?scp=1&sq=%22Stinginess%20on%20AIDS%22&st=cse&_r=0 (Accessed October 5, 2016). 
5 https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/overview/ (Accessed May 15, 2017). 
6 Written communication with a DFID staff member (December 15, 2017). 
 
3 
took place through IGOs—treaty-based international institutions established by at least three 
states and featuring a permanent secretariat (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004)—for 
example the World Bank, the UN, and regional organizations (such as the African Union). 
However, since the end of the Cold War, TGIs have become the preferred modality of 
cooperation in development. TGIs are multi-stakeholder partnerships that formally involve 
states along with IGOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and business actors 
(Westerwinter 2019c). In addition to the Global Fund, examples of TGIs include high-profile 
initiatives such as the UN Global Compact and less well-known ones such as the WorldFish 
Center. TGIs tend to produce non-legally binding policy output, which is partly a result of 
their multi-stakeholder nature. Furthermore, TGIs tend to be less institutionalized than IGOs, 
often, though not always, lacking organizational features such as independent secretariats and 
formally specified mechanisms for decision-making, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute 
settlement, which makes them “informal organizations” (Vabulas and Snidal 2013; 
Westerwinter 2019c; Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2019). 
Second, we juxtapose four potential explanations for why states establish TGIs. 
Functionalism posits that states create international institutions whose design reflects the 
functions they are supposed to deliver (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Haas 1964; Koremenos 2016; 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Power-oriented approaches posit that institutional 
designs reflect the interests of the most powerful states (Gruber 2000; Mearsheimer 1994; 
Stone 2013; Verdier 2015). Domestic politics relates design choices at the international level 
to the political incentives of governments at home, specifically participatory governance 
structures and norms that provide non-state actors with access to policy-making and 
implementation (Andonova 2014; Andonova, Hale, and Roger 2017; Remmer 2002; 
Westerwinter 2019d). Finally, we consider contextual design as a fourth approach, arguing 
that states do not design new organizations in an institutional vacuum but consider the 
existing landscape of multilateral organizations. In particular, states should be less likely to 
create a new organization if there is an organization that provides similar governance 
functions to them. Furthermore, states avail themselves of the flexible nature of TGIs to 
institutionalize the governance functions that even the most-similar existing organizations do 
not deliver (Westerwinter 2019a). 
We probe the validity of these theories for design choices in the multilateral development 
system. We choose the development regime for various reasons. First, it is the largest in terms 
of the number of organizations with respective mandate.7 Second, while qualitative research 
has documented important trends such as the rise of TGIs for this regime, related large-N 
analysis is lacking. And yet, such large-N analysis is the only way to arbitrate among different 
explanations of institutional design. Third, institutional design theories in which states are the 
primary actors are most applicable in the development regime because states remain the most 
important donors to global development causes, thereby likely having the ultimate say over 
global governance choices. 
                                                          
7 A related benefit is that it is relatively easy to establish whether an organization has a development mandate, 
given that most organizations report their activities to the benefit of developing countries on their website. 
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Our large-N analysis relies on the Transnational Public-Private Governance Initiatives in 
World Politics (TGIWP) dataset (Westerwinter 2019c). The TGIWP dataset filters TGIs from 
several data sources supplemented by a snowball procedure that draws on the websites of 
TGIs and other organizations. We combine the TGIWP data with expanded versions of the 
Correlates of War (COW) Project’s data on intergovernmental organizations (Pevehouse et al. 
2015) and the data on informal intergovernmental organizations originally collected by 
Vabulas and Snidal (2013). Our dataset thus provides the most comprehensive data for 
studying our research question. The data include 559 international organizations with a 
development mandate. To mitigate concerns about selection bias due to the partial 
observability of institutional design choices, we employ a Heckman selection model to jointly 
analyze the processes of institutional creation (‘Do states create a new organization?’) and 
institutional design (‘Is this organization a TGI?’). As the junctures at which states could have 
created new organizations (but failed to do so) are not systematically observed, we utilize 
multiple imputation (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) to obtain values on the main 
covariates in these instances. 
In preview of some of our results, we find institutional design choices are best explained by a 
combination of all four accounts. We obtain most robust support for functionalism, power-
oriented theories, and contextual design. We show these results are robust to alternative 
measurement of key indicators and alternative estimation methods. To illustrate the 
quantitative findings, we conduct an in-depth case study of the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Chemical Safety (IFCS)—a development TGI established in 1994. While the case analysis is 
consistent with all four accounts of institutional design, the contextual design view proves 
most useful in explaining two critical design choices—the multi-stakeholder nature of the 
organization and its lack of an independent technical secretariat. The case study thus 
undergirds the importance of the contextual design view as a complement to existing accounts 
of institutional choice (see, Westerwinter 2019a, for a more general treatment), while also 
contributing to measurement validation and further theoretical refinement of some of these 
accounts. 
Our study advances social-scientific research in International Relations in several ways. First, 
we complement three well-established rational approaches to institutional design with a fourth 
approach that focuses on institutional context. While existing research has looked at why 
states design (or fail to design) specific institutional forms (Vabulas and Snidal 2013), such as 
dispute settlement provisions (Koremenos 2013; Koremenos and Betz 2013; Rosendorff and 
Milner 2001), research looking across organizational types is still in its infancy. Furthermore, 
we theorize how the institutional context affects institutional design choices. Our argument 
chimes with recent historical-institutionalist accounts that emphasize the role of history and 
the bounded rationality of decision-making governments (Fioretos 2017; Jupille, Mattli, and 
Snidal 2013). But while such work draws its conclusions from case studies of 
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intergovernmental cooperation alone, we provide a large-N test of a context-sensitive design 
perspective along with measurement validation in a qualitative case study.8 
Second, we contribute to the literature on multi-stakeholder partnerships in development, 
which took off in response to the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in 2002 (Andonova and Levy 2003; Favotto and Kollman 2018; Kell 2013; Thérien and 
Pouliot 2006). The few studies in this area that propose explanations for the rise of such 
partnerships focus on supply-side factors such as the institution-building efforts by budget-
constrained IGOs (Andonova 2017; Andonova, Hale, and Roger 2017; Andonova and Levy 
2003; Bull, Bøås, and McNeill 2004; Hale and Roger 2014) and demand-side factors such as 
pressures for representation from NGOs, firms, and private donors (Bäckstrand 2006; 
Bulkeley et al. 2014; Elsig and Amalric 2008; Hoffmann 2011). These studies tend to 
overlook the relevance of a context-sensitive design perspective. Dingwerth and Pattberg 
(2009) use the theory of “organizational fields” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) to explain the 
apparent similarity of institutional designs among TGIs, but our explanation differs from 
organizational fields in that it predicts increasing dissimilarity among institutions. 
Third, we help substantiate popular claims in global governance, International Relations, and 
development policy research on the evolution of the multilateral development system. In 
particular, no study to date has measured quantitatively the extent to which development 
cooperation is organized around informal organizations, while related attempts have already 
been made in other areas, such as environmental regulation and climate governance (Abbott, 
Green, and Keohane 2016; Abbott and Hale 2014; Andonova 2010). Furthermore, some 
observers argue that the multilateral aid architecture has become increasingly crowded 
(Kharas 2007; Reisen 2010; World Bank 2008), worrying about the growing “fragmentation” 
that is thought to make the development regime less effective in tackling global problems 
(Benvenisti 2006; Biermann 2017; Biermann et al. 2009; Reinsberg 2016). Our results 
suggest that states are reluctant to fragment existing governance structures, even though they 
sometimes must do so to address burgeoning development challenges, particularly when no 
existing organization fulfills the intended role. Hence, rather than assuming a proclivity for 
institutional proliferation, we argue that states design institutions more carefully and are 
aware of the tradeoffs involved. 
Finally, we offer methodological contributions to studies of global governance and 
institutional choice. First, by deploying a Heckman selection model, we address the challenge 
of missing counterfactuals in the analysis of institutional choices. In addition, by 
complementing large-N analysis with a qualitative case study, we increase the validity of our 
findings. As the statistical model fits the data rather well, we choose a representative case for 
which the hypothesized mechanisms should be present. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first nested analysis (Lieberman 2005) in the sub-field of institutional design. Overall, 
these various methodological procedures are motivated by the aim to reduce bias in the 
estimates of interest to the fullest extent possible. 
                                                          
8 Copelovitch and Putnam (2014) propose a refinement of rational institutionalism that incorporates context by 
measuring the number of prior bilateral treaties submitted by state parties to the UN Treaty Series. Yet, their 
paper focuses on treaties, whereas our analysis covers different types of organizations. 
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We proceed as follows. Section 2 derives theoretical predictions for institutional design 
choices by states in global governance. The subsequent sections are empirical. Section 3 
traces the institutional evolution of the multilateral development architecture based on 
descriptive analysis of the TGIWP data. Section 4 presents the research design. Section 5 
presents regression results. Section 6 illustrates these findings with a qualitative case study. 
Section 7 summarizes the findings and concludes with a discussion of wider implications for 
global governance research. 
 
2. Drivers of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
The defining feature of TGIs is that their governance structures involve multiple stakeholders 
(Andonova 2010; Bull, Bøås, and McNeill 2004; Hale and Roger 2014). In addition, they tend 
to lack formalization with respect to the organizational features typically associated with 
IGOs and the degree to which their policy outputs are legally binding (Westerwinter, Abbott, 
and Biersteker 2019). We now draw on various rationalist approaches to identify the 
conditions under which states—as the primary decision-making actors in global governance—
choose TGIs to institutionalize cooperation.9 Conceptually, this choice is a two-stage process. 
In the first stage, states decide about whether or not to create a new organization. In the 
second stage, they select an organizational type.10 The various accounts emphasize different 
factors affecting these choices, including functional demands (“functionalism”), the interests 
of powerful states (“power-oriented theories”), domestic political institutions (“domestic 
politics”), and the pre-existing institutional architecture (“contextual design”). 
Functionalism 
Functionalists argue that design choices reflect the most efficient way to address a given 
problem (Koremenos 2016). A key functionalist determinant of institutional design is 
“problem structure.” To the extent that development challenges are increasingly complex—
partly as a result of economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977)—the transaction 
costs of creating new organizations increase (Hale, Held, and Young 2013)—despite the 
potential for issue linkage that may facilitate institutionalized cooperation (Keohane 1984). In 
terms of design choices, issue complexity makes purely intergovernmental solutions 
ineffective because complex problems require the involvement of all relevant stakeholders 
that contribute specific expertise, relevant capacity, and financial resources. To that end, 
states require more flexible governance structures. IGOs do not provide such flexibility 
because they can only admit state members, regardless of attempts to facilitate participation of 
                                                          
9 Our theoretical discussion focuses on the strategic choices of states. States are central players in the creation 
and design of TGIs and IGOs and their preferences have a strong impact on how institutional fields and global 
governance as a whole develop. Importantly, if they decide to engage in new institutionalized cooperation, states 
can choose whether they want to use a TGI or IGO. Other actors have more limited institutional options. It is, 
therefore, useful to focus on the agency and strategies of states in the theoretical argument. Future research may 
want to examine the strategies and institutional choices of non-state actors in greater detail to complement our 
analysis. 
10 Probably this is a simplification as states might take multiple decisions over individual design features. We 
will not disaggregate the second stage further here. 
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non-state actors (Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016). Conversely, TGIs allow states to 
respond flexibly to newly emerging development issues and to find solutions to problems that 
cut across many different issue areas. 
Other determinants of institutional design include the number of states, the homogeneity of 
state preferences, and various dimensions of uncertainty (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 
2001; Lipson 1991; Rosendorff and Milner 2001).11 As the number of states increases, 
institutionalized cooperation is less likely to emerge as transaction costs increase. However, if 
a new organization is created, it will more likely be an IGO as the number of member states 
increases. This is because larger groups of states face more severe collective action problems 
and hence prefer higher levels of delegated authority and formal structure to resolve these 
problems (Koremenos 2008, 154). In contrast, small numbers allow states to benefit from 
enhanced flexibility—bringing up any issue that they may desire and addressing issues in a 
timely manner—and the discretion entailed in decentralized policy implementation. 
As regards state preferences, more heterogeneous state preferences increase the likelihood of 
disputes and the risk of policy-making stalemate (Hale, Held, and Young 2013). While 
heterogeneous preferences reduce the likelihood that a new organization will be created, a 
given organization will be more formalized under such circumstances because states must fear 
that cheating will be more prevalent. Conversely, more harmonious preferences instill trust 
among states and thus lessen the need for centralized enforcement and dispute settlement 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2015). 
To summarize, according to functionalism, states will create a new organization under the 
following conditions: 
x The problem at hand is limited to one (or very few) issue area(s). 
x The number of states is small. 
x State preferences are relatively homogenous. 
States will design an organization as a TGI under the following conditions: 
x The problem at hand cuts across several issue areas. 
x The number of states is small. 
x State preferences are relatively homogenous. 
Power-oriented theories 
Power-oriented theories of international institutions recognize that power is unevenly 
distributed in the state system and argue that global governance arrangements are the direct 
                                                          
11 Uncertainty may be about state preferences, state behavior, and the state of the world (Koremenos, Lipson, and 
Snidal 2001). The first two should be less relevant in development, as states have incentives to make their 
actions for development visible. Uncertainty about the state of the world is relevant but hard to measure given 
that (unmeasurable) state perceptions matter here. We will capture uncertainty empirically using a number of 
issue area dummies. 
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result of how state power is distributed (Grieco 1988; Krasner 1991; Mearsheimer 1994). 
State power derives from valuable outside options, the size of the domestic market, and 
material capabilities (Gruber 2000; Kaya 2015; Voeten 2001). 
The prevalence of powerful countries makes institutionalized cooperation less likely. To be 
sure, some scholars in the tradition of hegemonic stability theory hold that powerful states can 
coerce weaker states into institutionalized cooperation upheld by them (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 
1980; Kindleberger 1973; Webb and Krasner 1989). However, apart from other challenges to 
hegemonic stability theory (Keohane 1984), there is no reason to believe that powerful states 
would prefer institutionalized governance over informal governance. Indeed, powerful states 
can coerce weaker states to comply with specific policies by pure threats, without the help of 
an international organization (Gruber 2000; Mearsheimer 1994; Steinberg 2002). In general, 
powerful states themselves are better off by not being bound by formal rules, as violating 
them may cause reputational damage (Axelrod 1984). Furthermore, less powerful states have 
no means to impose formal rules upon powerful ones. Therefore, new organizations are less 
likely to emerge to the extent that powerful states are present and state power is unevenly 
distributed. 
Furthermore, power politics also tilts institutional design choices in the favor of TGIs. To be 
sure, powerful states may have some incentives to formalize cooperation—for instance as a 
credible commitment device (Ikenberry 2001; Rodrik 1995; Stone 2011). However, they will 
concede to powerless states on secondary issues at best (Stone 2011; Verdier 2015; Voeten 
2001). Powerful states for the most part prefer informal designs and non-legally binding 
agreements (Thompson 2009). Informal organizations impose fewer constraints on power and 
hence increase the returns to power, which is particularly attractive for powerful states 
(Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2019). For instance, decision-making by consensus is 
favorable to powerful states as it gives them de-facto veto power without making dissent 
explicit (Gould 2017). Powerful states also wish to prevent robust enforcement provisions 
because it limits their returns to power politics. They also tend to oppose formalized dispute 
settlement because it empowers less powerful states by offering a legalized procedure to 
enforce their claims which, if ignored by the powerful state, would harm its reputation 
(Simmons 2000). For similar reasons, powerful states also prefer non-legally binding policy 
output. 
To illustrate the above points, the United States under its current administration provides a 
good example. In his first foreign policy speech, US president Donald Trump stated that 
under his administration, America will never enter “into any agreement that reduces our 
ability to control our own affairs,” arguing further he was “skeptical of international unions 
that tie us up and bring America down.”12 Consequently, Trump cut US funding for several 
UN organizations.13 Yet, as a powerful state, the United States has been reaping the benefits 
from informal organizations. The Proliferation Security Initiative—albeit not a development 
TGIs—provides an example. Launched by former US president George Bush in 2003, the 
initiative aims to control proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from states to non-state 
                                                          
12 http://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/ (accessed October 1, 2018). 
13 https://www.undispatch.com/heres-trumps-budget-request-impact-united-nations/ (accessed October 1, 2018). 
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actors. It requires participant states to share information concerning suspected proliferation 
activities, strengthen national legislation, and undertake joint missions to interdict shipments 
of such weapons. The initiative lacks a legal framework and clear definitions—deliberately so 
to provide maximum flexibility to participants in acting upon alleged acts of illicit 
proliferation (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2015). 
Both the preferences of powerful states and the distribution of power among states predict 
institutional design outcomes. For the reasons discussed above, institutionalized cooperation 
is more likely to take the form of a TGI if it includes powerful member states. Furthermore, a 
more unequal power distribution among member states is also conducive to a TGI design 
because the powerless countries—oftentimes dependent on aid transfers from powerful 
countries—have little choice but to go along with the design preference of the powerful 
states.14 
Following the above discussion, power-oriented theories would expect the creation of a new 
international organization under the following conditions: 
x The average participating state is less powerful. 
x Power across member states is evenly distributed. 
Furthermore, power-oriented theories would expect states to design a given organization as a 
TGI under the following conditions: 
x The average participating state is powerful. 
x Power across member states is unevenly distributed. 
Domestic institutions 
Finally, domestic political institutions, notably regime type, may affect design choices at the 
international level. The effect of regime type on the emergence of institutionalized 
cooperation is ambiguous. On the one hand, the logic of two-level games suggests that 
democracies have smaller win-sets, thereby reducing the range of potential outcomes 
involving institutionalized cooperation (Putnam 1988). On the other hand, democracies 
embody cooperative norms that should facilitate international cooperation (Remmer 2002). 
Newly democratic states may also promote a new international organization as it would 
provide them with a credible commitment device (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2012). However, 
their lacking ability to make credible commitments likely prevents other states to form an 
organization with them, which implies a negative relationship between regime type 
heterogeneity and the emergence of new organizations. In other words, if both democratic as 
well as non-democratic countries are involved in an attempted cooperative effort, the 
difficulties to credibly commit faced by non-democracies make the occurrence of new 
institutionalized cooperation less likely. 
                                                          
14 Obviously, powerless countries might have no interest to form a new organization under these parameters, 
which would predict that organizational creation is less likely when power differences are large. We will return 
to this issue in the empirical analysis. 
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In addition, domestic political institutions can affect the specific form of cooperative 
endeavors (Acharya 2016b; Raustiala 2005; Westerwinter 2019d).15 A group of states should 
design a new organization as a multi-stakeholder partnership if it is more democratic for two 
reasons. First, a demand-side argument holds that democracies make it easier for NGOs to 
organize, mobilize, and participate in global governance (Andonova 2014; Andonova, Hale, 
and Roger 2017; Kahler 2016). Second, a supply-side argument holds that democracies have 
embraced the right of non-state actors to participate in political decision-making, both 
domestically and internationally. Whereas IGOs are limited in their extent to which they can 
include non-state actors into decision-making processes (Dingwerth, Schmidtke, and Weise 
2011; Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016), TGIs provide governance structures that can 
accommodate demands for meaningful participation from non-state actors (Andonova, Hale, 
and Roger 2017). We therefore argue that states collectively prefer to cooperate through 
TGIs—rather than IGOs—to the extent that their domestic political regimes are democratic. 
Further, regime type heterogeneity also affects the choice of a TGI as mode of 
institutionalized cooperation. Given the commitment problems of non-democratic 
governments, democratic governments that contemplate to cooperate with non-democracies 
will need assurances that they will comply with the rules and policies that are agreed. 
Domestic institutions cannot provide these assurances. Thus, democracies will push for 
formalized institutional structures that provide legally binding rules accompanied by a 
centralized monitoring and enforcement apparatus to safeguard the cooperation from 
defection by their non-democratic partners. As a result, if states with heterogeneous regime 
types initiate new institutionalized cooperation, it is less likely to take the form of a TGI since 
TGIs are not well-suited to provide the assurances required by democracies. 
In summary, states are more likely to create a new organization if the maximum difference in 
regime types is large (while the effect of average levels of democracy is ambiguous). A new 
organization is more likely to take the form of a TGI under the following conditions: 
x The average member country is more democratic. 
x A small difference in regime types across member states. 
Contextual design 
A contextual design perspective assumes that states make institutional choices in view of the 
existing global governance architecture. In particular, we argue that states want to avoid 
functional duplication to minimize transaction costs, especially when the pre-existing 
institutional landscape is crowded. This argument builds on previous work emanating in 
response to rational institutionalism and arguing that a denser institutional context can 
facilitate more formalized cooperation in subsequent stages of institutionalized cooperation 
(Duffield 2003; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013; Copelovitch and Putnam 2014; Gehring and 
Faude 2014; Fioretos 2017). 
                                                          
15 In fact, studies in the New Interdependence Approach tradition examine how domestic institutions affect the 
ability of politicians to construct the rules and norms governing interdependent relations and how 
interdependence itself affects domestic institutions (Farrell and Newman 2014; Fioretos 2011; Slaughter 2004). 
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We borrow from this line of thought to argue that states design new organizations that 
complement the governance functions of existing organizations. This distinguishes our 
argument from the previous works which imply that deeper context facilitates deeper 
cooperation, which is not necessary in our account. Our argument here resonates with the 
work of Gehring and Faude (2014) who emphasize the emergence of an institutionalized 
division of labor in areas of overlap between IGOs. We expand the discussion of institutional 
complementarity toward the relationships between formal and informal modes of governance 
and the creation of TGIs. Thus, we argue and show empirically that concerns about 
complementarity are not only affecting the operations of existing institutions but are 
important factors in the initiation and design of new institutions. Why would states want new 
organizations to be complementary to the existing ones? Despite individual incentives for 
“forum-shopping”—the practice of (powerful) states to shift policy discussions to governance 
venues where they expect the greatest benefit for themselves (Busch 2007; Drezner 2009; 
Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2013; Helfer 2004)—states collectively want to avoid duplication of 
tasks in the multilateral system as it increases the cost of development cooperation (Cooley 
and Ron 2002; Drezner 2009; Panneels and Beringhs 2005). For example, Drezner (2009) 
argues that regime complexity can undermine the significance of organizations by diluting the 
power of previously constructed focal points promoting rule-based cooperation. An example 
is the declining “focality” of the WHO brought about by the proliferation of global health 
initiatives (Hanrieder 2015). Furthermore, overlapping mandates across organizations bear the 
risk of conflicting commitments that will lessen the sense of legal obligation among states to 
comply with their commitments (Morse and Keohane 2014). Finally, regime complexity 
raises transaction costs for all actors (Raustiala and Victor 2004). 
The above discussion implies the following hypothesis regarding the emergence of new 
organizations given the institutional context: 
x States are less likely to create a new organization if an existing organization already 
performs highly similar tasks in a given issue area. 
While creating new organizations may sometimes be necessary, states can avoid task 
duplication by letting these organizations only perform certain functions but relying on 
existing organizations to perform other functions. Therefore, TGIs tend to be complementary 
to IGOs with respect to their task structure. Given that IGOs—through maintaining a 
professional international bureaucracy—have a competitive edge in the implementation of 
large-scale policies and the production of technical knowledge, states establish TGIs 
specifically for the purposes of raising awareness for new issues, promoting policy consensus, 
and harnessing the value of partnerships.16 
                                                          
16 While, in principle, both new IGOs and TGIs can be designed to enhance institutional complementarity in a 
given governance field, TGIs are particularly suitable and attractive devices to achieve institutional 
complementarity. TGIs are a different species of cooperative form whose comparative advantage is convening 
power. Because of their more restrictive membership structure IGOs are less well-equipped to act as convenors. 
In addition, the complexity of contemporaneous challenges is such that it is ever less possible to foresee which 
governance functions will actually be needed and that these functions need to be adapted to changing 
circumstances. Again, IGOs are less convenient to states for that purpose, given much higher costs for 
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The Global Fund provides a case in point. While traditional IGOs perform an implementing 
role, the Global Fund is tasked with resource mobilization and program monitoring. In line 
with recent scholarship, the relationship between the Global Fund and its associated 
organizations can be called “orchestration,” defined as “the mobilization of an intermediary 
by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal” (Abbott et al. 
2015). For example, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an orchestrator that uses a 
range of intermediaries to deliver its assistance (Graham and Thompson 2016). While the 
GEF mobilizes resources for climate-related development activities and allocates these 
resources to projects, the traditional IGOs (so-called “GEF agencies”) prepare bids for GEF 
funds with local partners (Bayer, Marcoux, and Urpelainen 2015; Graham 2017; Michaelowa, 
Reinsberg, and Schneider 2018). 
The implication of this argument is that newly established TGIs will look different from even 
the most-similar existing organizations as they are designed to perform different tasks in a 
given issue area.17 If it is true that TGIs partner with existing IGOs—to benefit from their 
relative organizational strengths—a more specific hypothesis can be formulated in that newly 
created TGIs would look dissimilar to existing IGOs in terms of their task profile in a given 
issue area. In summary, the above discussion yields the following hypotheses regarding 
design choices: 
x A new organization is less likely to take the form of a TGI to the extent that an 
existing organization performs similar tasks in a given issue area. 
x A new organization is less likely to the form of a TGI to the extent that an existing 
IGO performs similar tasks in a given issue area. 
 
3. A new dataset to study the historical development of the multilateral aid architecture 
In this section, we use a new dataset to describe the institutional evolution of the multilateral 
development system. ‘Development’ is a particularly relevant issue area given that most 
international organizations contribute to it. To identify as many as possible international 
development organizations, we draw on the TGIWP dataset (Westerwinter 2019c). This 
dataset was obtained by identifying TGIs in several existing databases on transnational 
institutions, including the Global Solution Networks data (Abbott and Hale 2014), data from 
MSI Integrity and the Duke Human Rights Center at the Kenan Institute (2017), the 
transnational climate governance initiatives data (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017), the 
orchestration of transnational climate change data (Hale and Roger 2014), the Global 
Sustainability Partnership Database (Pattberg et al. 2012), and the multi-bi aid data 
(Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017).18 These cases were complemented by TGIs identified 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
institutional or policy change in comparison to TGIs. Thus, pursuing institutional complementarity with respect 
to existing IGIOs can be achieved more effectively and at lower costs using TGIs rather than new IGOs. 
17 Note how this differs from the prediction of a sociological account in which organizations within a field 
become more similar due to mimetic isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell 1991). 
18 For a full list of sources, see Westerwinter (2019a). 
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through a snowball procedure based on the websites of TGIs and other organizations.19 For 
comparative purposes, we combine the TGIWP data with data on formal IGOs—the most 
recent version of the COW Project’s data on intergovernmental organizations (Pevehouse et 
al. 2015)—and informal IGOs (Vabulas and Snidal 2013).20 This dataset offers the most 
inclusive collection of international organizations to date. For the development sector, it 
includes historical records of 559 organizations, consisting of 196 IGOs, 49 IIGOs, and 314 
TGIs. 
While the data provide a high-level view of organizational types in the development system, 
they mask what happens within organizations. For instance, the data do not capture to what 
extent existing organizations expand their mandates over time—whether as a result of 
mandate expansion or agency slippage (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Florini 2011; Grabel 
2011; Moschella 2011). The data also do not include agency trust funds, which are quasi-
international institutions established under the institutional law of a host IGO in order to 
support new activities. In addition, the data also disregard inter-organizational relations, 
specifically at the operational level (Biermann and Koops 2017). The data also overlooks joint 
programs between IGOs unless they are institutionalized through intergovernmental 
agreements. Further, the data necessarily underestimate the true amount of informality, 
specifically the forms of informal processes that remain below the radar of the public.21 
Finally, the data do not capture budgetary growth but rely on raw counts of organizations to 
reflect developments in the multilateral development architecture, thus potentially inflating 
the significance of TGIs.22 
Despite these limitations, the data allow for the first large-N analysis of the institutional 
evolution of the multilateral development system over the past century. The multilateral 
development system came into existence only after World War II, but continuously expanded 
ever since. Its emergence is linked to the concept of “foreign aid”—a resource transfer from 
developed countries to less developed ones with the aim of increasing living standards—while 
its further evolution is influenced by the rise of new ideas and the evolving meanings of what 
“development” is about, from economic growth and industrial development, to human 
development, human rights and political freedom, and global public goods. 
In terms of its institutional evolution, the development regime has progressively expanded—
from 18 organizations with activities in development in 1945 to 473 organizations in 2017. 
                                                          
19 Westerwinter (2019a) provides extensive details on the sample generation, operationalization of variables, and 
a broad range of descriptive statistics. 
20 We thank Jon Pevehouse for sharing the data prior to their public release. 
21 Examples of informal groups in development not covered by the data are the “Geneva group”—an alliance of 
originally five states (and today having 18 member states) to usher budgetary restraint at the UN agencies and to 
promote UN reform (Blanchfield 2008). Another informal club is the “Utstein Group”, established in 1999 by 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, with a commitment to 
“promoting increased coherence, coordination and cooperation on various issues including those activities 
variously characterized as conflict prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding” (OECD 2004). 
22 However, TGIs play an important role in resource mobilization and thus often serve as “points of entry” of 
bilateral donor funds (Reinsberg 2017). It would thus be problematic to consider administrative budgets alone, 
which would over-represent IGOs. 
 
14 
The end of World War II marked a foundational moment for the regime, given the creation of 
four new IGOs—the UN, the WHO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The rate of new IGO entrants into the development system remained relatively high 
for several reasons. First, following the rapid recovery of Europe, many European countries 
themselves became donors. The entry of additional donors into the system made informal 
coordination necessary, leading to the establishment of the Donor Assistance Committee 
(DAC) that became part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 1961. Second, to respond to the special needs of developing countries, donors 
created the International Development Association (IDA)—the first concessional 
development fund, managed by IBRD staff—and other regional development banks (Manning 
2014). Various funds and programs at the UN level were formed, covering issues such as 
industrial development, agricultural productivity, environmental protection, and human 
development. Third, as developing countries felt excluded from the governance processes of 
these organizations, they established new institutions to underpin their own understandings of 
development, notably the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD)—an IGO 
serving as intellectual spearhead of the informal G-77 group of developing countries to 
counter the Western ideological hegemony. The rate of establishment of new IGOs remained 
stable even in the ‘lost decade’, which followed the two oil price shocks and the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods order in the 1970s. The bulk of new IGOs was the result of efforts to 
promote regional integration, while a few IGOs followed from UN conferences by which the 
UN kept trying to draw public attention to new development challenges and lobbied donors to 
create new funds and programs, for example the International Fund for Agriculture and 
Development (IFAD).23 
[Figure 1 here] 
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the modalities of cooperation have moved away 
from IGOs, notably toward TGIs (and to a lesser extent toward informal IGOs). The data 
show that as the establishment of new IGOs leveled off, TGIs have been exploding since the 
end of the Cold War (Figure 1). Given this growth, TGIs have been outgrowing IGOs since 
2002—the year in which the Global Fund started its operations. Even the recent institution-
building efforts by rising powers, which led to the creation of the New Development Bank 
(NDB), established by the five BRICS countries, and the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) (Humphrey 2015), do not alter the general picture. In fact, they 
further reinforce the trend toward informalism with clubs like the g7+, BRICS, and IBSA 
Forum (Kahler 2013).24 
The takeoff of TGIs is reflected in the growing presence of private actors in the multilateral 
development system (Büthe and Cheng 2013). As many donor governments reduced their 
financial support for IGOs, private donors began to fill the void by launching partnership 
funds with IGOs. For example, in 1998 the UN accepted a donation from US philanthropist 
                                                          
23 IFAD was established following UNGA Resolution 32/107 in 1978 and the 1974 World Food Conference that 
was held in response to the famine in Bangladesh. 
24 The g7+ is an informal association of seven fragile states established in 2008 with the aim of raising awareness 
for fragility and mobilizing donor support (Marah 2015). 
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Ted Turner, who made available USD 1 billion to support a UN Fund for International 
Partnerships (UNFIP) and the UN Foundation (Bull, Bøås, and McNeill 2004). Through the 
Global Compact, the UN has intensified links with private actors (Berliner and Prakash 2015; 
Kell 2013; Thérien and Pouliot 2006). Private donors, notably the Gates Foundation, was 
critical to the establishment (and rapid takeoff) of the Global Fund. In fact, global 
philanthropists have become important donors particularly in global public health (Fidler 
2016). 
While the growth of TGIs and the relative decline of IGOs is the most apparent trend, the data 
show that the multilateral development system also has transformed in less visible ways 
during the past century. In particular, there is evidence that the system has become less 
universal in terms of its state membership early on. The IGOs established in the first decade 
after World War II all enjoy broad membership, perform tasks that none of the existing 
organizations had delivered, and feature a high level of institutionalization. In contrast, the 
IGOs created later are deficient in most of these dimensions. For instance, the DAC is a club 
of rich donors; UNCTAD was pioneered by a group of developing countries; and all regional 
organizations are exclusive by design. The fraction of states that participated in newly created 
IGOs bottomed at around 20% at the end of the Cold War but rose again after it. Interestingly, 
this was not at the expense of depth, as institutional formalization of IGOs—specifically 
regarding independent secretariats, monitoring mechanisms, and decision-making 
procedures—has generally increased after the Cold War.25 The perhaps most well-
documented IGO foundation in the post-millennium era is the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA)—an IGO mandated to promote the adoption of all forms of 
renewable energy by conducting policy analysis and providing technical assistance (Colgan, 
Keohane, and van de Graaf 2012). With all major design features formally institutionalized, 
this case fits the general trend well. 
The apparent consequence of the recent TGI growth is a growing fragmentation of the 
multilateral development system, i.e., the governance of development is increasingly marked 
by a patchwork of institutions that differ in their characteristics, member configurations, as 
well as policy and geographical scope (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Biermann et al. 2009; 
Keohane and Victor 2011). The explosion of TGIs is linked to increased fragmentation 
because TGIs are generally less inclusive and less representative of the state community, as 
they tend to be dominated by Western donors. The data demonstrate that TGIs are dominated 
by affluent countries, notably the United States (200 memberships), the United Kingdom (151 
memberships), Germany (119 memberships), and the Netherlands (110 memberships), while 
China, Kenya, and South Africa as the first non-DAC countries in this list are less engaged in 
such initiatives (with around 50 memberships each). Overall, these patterns chime with 
previously observed trends of declining universalism, or “minilateralism” (Bernstein 2013; 
Falkner 2016; Kahler 1992).26 
 
                                                          
25 See Figure A1 in the supplemental appendix. 
26 For an analysis of issue-task similarity of new entrants to the regime over time, see Figure A2. 
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4. Research design 
Institutional design in global politics is a two-stage process. In the first stage, states decide 
whether a new organization is necessary. In the second stage, given their decision to create a 
new organization, they select an organizational type. A key challenge is that only those 
organizations (and their organizational types) are ever observed which states decided to 
create. Conversely, the set of organizations that did not come into existence is unknown. After 
introducing the main variables for the statistical analysis, we will explain below how we 
address the partial observability problem. 
Dependent variables 
The ultimate outcome of interest is a categorical variable indicating whether a given 
organization is designed as a TGI. A TGI is an international institution that includes at least 
one state or IGO, one business actor, and one NGO, which is transnational in nature and 
which performs tasks that are related to governing global or transnational problems 
(Westerwinter 2019c). TGIs differ from IIGOs, which are international institutions 
characterized by explicitly shared expectations among loosely associated state members who 
participate in regular meetings but without significant formal institutionalization (Vabulas and 
Snidal 2013). Notably, IIGOs do not formally include non-state actors in their governance 
structures. In addition, TGIs also differ from IGOs, which are defined as international 
organizations established by at least three member states through formal treaty and supported 
by a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarter (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and 
Warnke 2004). For the main analysis, we employ a binary TGI indicator for which the 
relevant comparison group includes IGOs. We also employ an alternative operationalization 
for robustness tests in which the comparison group includes both IGOs and IIGOs. Both 
indicators yield very similar results. 
In addition, we use the TGIWP dataset to construct an ordinal index of organizational 
structure, which reflects the degree to which institutional features commonly associated with 
highly structured IGOs are present in a given organization. This allows us to assess whether 
an organization has an independent secretariat, whether it specifies decision-making 
procedures, whether it monitors the behavior of its participants, whether it has enforcement 
provisions to restore state compliance, and whether it has an institutionalized dispute 
settlement mechanism. The TGIWP dataset collects this information based on human coding 
of founding documents, official websites, donor reports, and research papers on the respective 
international organizations. For each design feature being present, the index increases by one 
point. In line with expectations, IGOs score highest on this index (2.19), while IIGOs (0.47) 
and TGIs (0.74) score lower due to their relative lack of organizational structure (Table 1). 
[Table 1 here] 
Independent variables 
We include varying sets of variables corresponding to alternative explanations for design 
choices of international organizations. Capturing tenets of functionalism, we include the 
(logged) NUMBER OF ISSUES that an organization addresses. we expect a positive relationship 
 
17 
with informality, given the well-known tradeoff between broader mandates and deeper 
commitments (Gilligan 2004). This variable may also serve as proxy for issue complexity and 
uncertainty since multiple purposes increase ambiguity, with potential effects on structural 
features (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Best 2012; Jojarth 2009). Furthermore, we include the 
logged NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES, expecting a negative sign because cooperation involving 
many states is less likely to be informal. To measure PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY, we 
compute the maximum ideological distance across member states based on ideal-point 
estimates from UN General Assembly voting patterns (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015). 
We expect a negative sign because greater ideological distance implies less harmonious 
preferences, which makes informality less likely. 
Two variables are used to capture power politics. First, to measure POWER prevalence in an 
organization, we use the logged average GDP of its member states. To capture POWER 
DIFFERENCE, we use the logged difference of the highest GDP (for the most powerful country) 
and the lowest GDP (for the least powerful country). Underlying data for this variable are 
available from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015). 
To capture domestic institutions, we include two measures. First, we include the average level 
of democracy among the member states, measured by the Polity IV index (Marshall, Jaggers, 
and Gurr 2010). A higher level of democracy will provide non-state actors with more 
opportunities to participate in global governance processes, and such groups will also be more 
able to seize these opportunities as they are active at the domestic level. We therefore expect a 
positive relationship between (average) POLITY IV and the choice of TGI. Second, we include 
the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the Polity IV score across the 
membership of the organization. We expect a negative relationship between POLITY IV 
DIFFERENCE and the choice of TGI, which is the result of the commitment value of democratic 
institutions. In particular, autocratic states cannot credibly commit to certain policies as they 
face comparatively fewer veto players to change policies. Therefore, democratic states will 
seek reassurance from these states through formal commitments and organizational structures 
that informal organizations (such as TGIs) are unable to afford. 
To test whether design choices are contingent on existing institutions, we measure for any 
given organization the extent to which previously existing organizations operate in similar 
issue areas and provide similar governance functions in these areas.27 There is useful variation 
in issue areas as organizations can be active in other issue areas, despite already being active 
in development. We first compute the cosine similarity of the issue area profiles between a 
given organization and every previously existing organization, i.e. organizations that were 
created prior to the founding year of a given institution and did not cease to exist up until this 
year. Cosine similarities range from zero (indicating orthogonal portfolios) to one (identical 
portfolios). We then compute the cosine similarity over governance task profiles for all pairs 
of organizations. Finally, we employ element-wise multiplication of both vectors and identify 
                                                          
27 The database distinguishes eight issue areas (security, environment, health, human rights, trade and commerce, 
finance, social affairs, and technical issues) and eight governance functions (gathering information, agenda-
setting, service provision, funding, capacity-building, standard-setting, policy implementation, and monitoring 
behavior). This implies any organization can be characterized by a 16-dimensional vector of issuetask 
combinations. 
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the maximum among paired organizations. In this way, we obtain for each organization a 
scalar value which corresponds to the degree of issue-task similarity with respect to the most-
similar previously existing organization, labeled MOST-SIMILAR PREVIOUS IO. 
All covariates are measured at the foundational year of a given organization,28 which means 
that time information is integrated even though the analysis is cross-sectional. In addition to 
the correlates of interest, we include seven decennial period dummies to account for global 
trends in design choices, corresponding to the periods 1945-54, 1955-64, 1965-74, 1975-84, 
1985-94, 1995-2004, and 2005-17 (the baseline being the pre-1945 period). We also control 
for the (logged) NUMBER OF STATES in the system (Barnett, Pevehouse, and Raustiala 2016; 
Hooghe and Marks 2015; Ingram and Torfason 2010). We use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors for inference. Arguably, most correlates are potentially endogenous as they are 
based on the set of member states of a given institution alone. While this is an approach 
commonly adopted in this literature (Allee and Elsig 2014; Copelovitch and Putnam 2014; 
Koremenos 2016), it is important to not interpret the effects of these variables causally but to 
consider them as indicative of the characteristics of various institutional types.29 Unless 
otherwise stated, variables are drawn from the TGIWP data. Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics of the main variables used. 
[Table 2 here] 
Selection model 
As outlined above, the analysis faces the challenge of partial observability in the outcome of 
interests. In other words, conducting the analysis only for observed organizations may yield 
biased estimates, specifically if unobserved variables induce correlation between 
organizational design and the decision to create a new organization. This problem can be 
addressed using a selection model that explicitly models the first stage (Heckman 1976). 
Specifically, we employ a bivariate probit model as the dependent variables in both stages are 
binary. However, the model cannot be estimated on the observed sample alone because the 
first-stage outcome is constant. 
What is the set of potential organizations that were never created? To induce variation in first-
stage outcomes, we assume that organizations can plausibly be located within the space that 
combines issue areas and governance tasks. We thus draw random profiles of issue areas and 
governance tasks30 and let these observations correspond to the organizations that were never 
created and add them to our sample. As the covariates for these non-existing organizations are 
not observable, we generate five rectangular datasets of those covariates using multiple 
imputation (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011). We then conduct bivariate probit analyses 
using these five datasets and aggregate the results, taking into account the additional 
                                                          
28 The obvious exception is the contextual design variable, which takes into account all information up to the 
foundational year. 
29 The ideal approach would be to measure all variables among the potential members of an organization. Yet, as 
it is unclear what the set of potential members is, this approach to theory-testing is not feasible. 
30 Formally, a profile is an n-tupel (n=16) of binary variables, given 8 issue areas and 8 governance tasks. 
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uncertainty that arises from imputation (Rubin 1987).31 In other words, to circumvent 
selection bias induced by confounding residual correlation between institutional creation and 
institutional design, we create additional observations in the first stage that correspond to 
‘proposal organizations’ that were never created. This appears to be the most appropriate 
remedy to the selection problem because it analytically separates the decision to create an 
organization from the decision on its design. For our purpose, it is preferable to a potential 
alternative approach which builds on the assumption that an organization of a given type (e.g., 
TGI) could also have been created as another type (e.g., IGO) given identical covariates (see 
Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2017, who adopt this approach in the context of different 
trust funds). By construction, this alternative approach yields insignificant predictors for the 
first stage because the same covariates predict both the success and failure of a creation of an 
organization—which is why we prefer the former approach.32  
While the Heckman selection model is a standard remedy against selection bias, it is known to 
be more consistent if the first stage includes an exclusion restriction (Sartori 2003)—a 
variable that correlates with institutional creation but not organizational types. We argue that 
the (logged) number of organizations created in a given year fulfills these criteria.33 
Empirically, the correlation is highly positively significant (p<0.01); the intuition for this 
result is that states create new organizations when the historical conditions to do so are 
favorable, which leads to a clustering of foundational years. Furthermore, elevated rates of 
institutional creation do not per se predict which types will be chosen—neither theoretically 
nor empirically.34 
 
5. Quantitative analysis 
Table 3 presents the full set of results. The upper part of the table corresponds to the first 
stage, while the lower part presents the second stage. Columns correspond to all possible 
combinations in the usage of issue area and governance task dummies. All regressions include 
the number of states in the system and period dummies as basic control variables. Some 
predictors are remarkably robust across the various models. 
Functionalism fares moderately well. Consistent with functionalist expectations, institutional 
creation is less likely in the presence of issue area complexity (p<0.01). The number of 
member states is not a robust predictor of institutional creation, although the direction of the 
effect is correct. Preference heterogeneity is statistically significant (p<0.05) but puzzlingly 
positively related to institutional creation. However, preference heterogeneity correctly 
                                                          
31 We add N1=2,000 observations in the first stage. This number is arbitrary but not consequential for the 
findings. Note that the second stage is still based on only the observed organizations (N2=559), but its estimates 
take potential unobservable selection effects into account. 
32 Nonetheless, for the purpose of testing robustness, we implement this alternative approach in the Appendix 
and confirm that our core results hold (see Table A5). 
33 To avoid a tautological correlation, this count only considers organizations other than the one corresponding to 
a given observation in the dataset. 
34 Indeed, the logged number of co-creations is not a significant predictor of organizational types. 
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predicts the choice of TGIs, but the result loses robustness upon inclusion of fixed effects. 
Issue area complexity does not seem to matter, possibly because it is already explained by 
period dummies. Further, a smaller number of states facilitates cooperation through TGIs as 
opposed to formal IGOs (p<0.01). Overall, functionalism receives mixed support, with some 
of its variables receiving robust support across different model specifications. 
A similar picture emerges for power-oriented accounts. Consistent with expectations, a more 
unequal power distribution adversely affects the odds of institutionalized cooperation 
(p<0.01). The presence of powerful countries as such tends to have a similar effect. As to TGI 
design, the presence of powerful countries promotes TGI designs, but part of the effect can be 
explained away by fixed effects so that power remains marginally significant in the last 
model. Power differences across member states do not have a significant effect on the TGI 
design choice. 
Domestic politics receives relatively less support across the models. In the creation stage, 
none of the polity variables is statistically significant, although their estimated directions are 
consistent with theoretical expectations. In the design stage, more democratic groups of states 
prefer to design TGIs. The effects of regime type differences are statistically insignificant. 
The contextual design view receives robust support. Consistent with expectations, states are 
less likely to create a new organization if a previous organization fulfills similar functions. 
When controlling for issue area dummies, this effect is statistically significant (p<0.05). In 
addition, states are less likely to design a TGI to the extent that the most-similar previous 
organization fulfills similar governance functions in the same issue area. This result is 
statistically significant across different models—despite a host of controls and dummies for 
time periods, issue areas, governance tasks, and the (logged) number of states in the system. 
To examine the substantive importance of the various explanations, we calculate the effects of 
an increase in the relevant predictors by their respective standard deviation (SD).35 With 
respect to institutional creation, we find that a 1-SD increase in issue complexity reduces the 
likelihood of a new organization to be established by at most 13.7% (p<0.01). Conversely, a 
1-SD increase in power differences predicts at most a 10.4% lower likelihood of institutional 
creation (p<0.01). Finally, a 1-SD increase in IO similarity reduces the likelihood of creation 
by at most 4.3% (p<0.05). 
With respect to institutional design, a 1-SD increase in membership reduces the TGI 
probability by 7.7% (95%-CI: 2.6% to 14.0%), while the same increase in preference 
heterogeneity increases this probability by 7.9% (95%-CI: 0.7% to 15.2%). Furthermore, a 1-
SD increase in power prevalence is associated with at most a 14.1% higher likelihood of TGIs 
(95%-CI: 3.7% to 24.6%), while a 1-SD increase in Polity IV implies at most 5.6% (95%-CI: 
0.2% to 11.0%). Finally, increasing IO similarity by 1-SD reduces the TGI probability by at 
most 6.9% (95%-CI: 2.7% to 11.1%). 
Overall, this suggests that for the development regime the most relevant explanations for 
institutional choices are issue complexity and power differentials as far as institutional 
                                                          
35 We always interpret the highest of the coefficients to obtain an upper bound. 
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creation is concerned. To account for the choice of TGIs, power prevalence is the most 
influential variable, while functionalist variables and contextual design are similarly 
important with somewhat lower predicted effect sizes. Average democracy is the least 
important explanation for the choice of TGIs. 
Model diagnostics undergird the plausibility of the estimates. The goodness of fit is strong, 
implying that the log-likelihoods of the models are at least twice as large as a null model 
without any predictors. Furthermore, there is no residual correlation in the errors of the two 
equations, which suggests that no important joint determinants of institutional design choices 
were omitted. Finally, the variable SYSTEM GROWTH, which is the logged number of other 
organizations created in the same year, is a highly relevant predictor for the creation of a 
given organization (Ft23). To the extent that it is excludable, the second-stage estimates are 
causally interpretable. 
[Table 3 here] 
Robustness tests 
Beyond considering various sets of control variables in the above analysis, we further probe 
the robustness of our main results in the supplemental appendix and report briefly on the 
findings of this exercise here. First, we use an alternative operationalization of the dependent 
variable, which compares TGIs across all other organizations (rather than just IGOs) in the 
second stage. This increases the number of potential observations by 49 IIGO cases but does 
not otherwise affect the substantive conclusions to be drawn from the regressions (Table A1). 
Second, we also test the four institutional design explanations individually. This reduces 
multi-collinearity and thus we can estimate the effects of some predictors more precisely. For 
instance, preference heterogeneity now tends to be negatively related to institutional creation, 
while continuing to be driving the choice of TGIs. Similarly, estimates of democracy are more 
precise in both stages (p<0.01). The same conclusion holds for the contextual design variable, 
which is strongly negatively significant in both stages (Table A2). Results are also robust 
when changing the relevant comparison group—juxtaposing TGIs against formal IGOs and 
informal IGOs (Table A3)—rather than just IGOs as in the previous robustness check. 
Finally, we use a continuous measure of organizational structure as the dependent variable 
rather than organizational types. This robustness test is useful because TGIs tend to be less 
structured than formal IGOs, although TGIs also vary in their level of institutionalization. 
Note that this reverses the expected coefficient signs in the second stage. Tapping the 
additional variation in structure, we find that functionalism and specifically issue area 
complexity becomes a more salient explanation of institutional design, while the power-based 
explanation loses its significance in the TGI stage. With regard to domestic politics, it is now 
the difference across regime types that positively relates to the choice of TGIs. Finally, the 
contextual design results are highly significant in both stages and consistent with theoretical 
expectations (Table A4). 
Overall, the analysis has produced some robust associations between institutional design 
choices and rationalist design theories. In line with functionalism, issue complexity makes 
 
22 
new institutions less likely and tends to make adoption of TGI designs more likely. In 
addition, power differentials reduce the likelihood of new institutions, while homogenous 
groups of powerful states prefer TGIs to govern development cooperation. In line with 
contextual design, higher degrees of similarity with the organizational field reduce the 
appetite for new institutions but increase the chances of states choosing a TGI design. To cast 
light on the underlying mechanisms, we now present evidence from a qualitative case study. 
 
6. Case study 
To illustrate the quantitative findings, we study the establishment of the IFCS. The statistical 
model predicts well both its creation and its organizational type.36 Therefore, an in-depth 
study of this case promises insights into the mechanism underlying contextual design and 
other institutional design explanations. The purpose of the case study thus is not a ‘hard test’ 
of our argument, but to demonstrate its plausibility by examining motivations of key 
stakeholders involved in the design choice. 
Organizational purpose 
The IFCS was established in 1994 as a multi-stakeholder alliance around the issue of 
chemical safety—“the prevention of the adverse effects […] to humans and the environment 
from the production, storage, transportation, use, and disposal of chemicals.”37 Its goal was to 
develop international partnerships among its diverse stakeholders including national 
governments, IGOs, and NGOs such as public-interest associations, labor unions, industry 
groups, scientific bodies, and civil society representatives for the sound management of 
chemicals. IFCS was the only forum where any stakeholder could bring up any issue related 
to sound management of chemicals. Its key activities included the provision of policy 
guidance, the development of strategies in a coordinated manner, the fostering of 
understanding of issues and stakeholder positions, and the promotion of policy support.38 The 
day-to-day administrative work was supported by a trust fund, which also facilitated 
participation of developing countries and local NGOs.39 In terms of institutional structure, the 
Forum Sessions represented the highest decision-making organ in which all participants 
participated. The Forum Sessions delegated certain functions to the Forum Standing 
Committee, which served as conduit for the views of participant countries in their respective 
IFCS regions or non-governmental constituency. The Standing Committee comprised 25 
IFCS participants and was supported by the Executive Secretary.40 
Dimensions of informality 
                                                          
36 The predicted probabilty of creation is 91% and the predicted probability of a TGI design is 65%.  
37 http://www.who.int/ifcs/en/. 
38 http://www.who.int/ifcs/en/. 
39 https://www.who.int/ifcs/financing/en/. 
40 http://www.who.int/ifcs/standingcommittee/en/. 
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In terms of organizational type, IFCS was a TGI as its constitutive members included states 
and non-state actors. Compared to other TGIs, it was relatively structured. IFCS had a 
secretariat, hosted at the WHO. Its terms of reference codified voting procedures, notably 
decision-making by consensus in the forum on all decisions. There were no provisions for 
monitoring, enforcement, and dispute settlement. 
In terms of policy output, IFCS produced non-legally binding resolutions. Its main task was to 
issue reports that synthesized independent information on chemical safety, including the 
related implications on health, the environment, and socioeconomic development. Its aims 
were to “build partnerships, provide advice and guidance, make recommendations, and 
monitor progress.”41 IFCS had neither the mandate nor the resources to implement 
recommendations; rather, it relied on decentralized action by governments, for instance 
through the IGOs that participated in it. 
Historical background 
The issue of chemical safety emerged first in the developed countries when new chemicals 
came to the market but very few were ever evaluated for their health consequences, creating a 
need for risk assessment, information sharing, knowledge production, and waste management. 
Two factors facilitated a global regulatory response: the first was growing economic 
interdependence and trade in chemicals, which could only be insufficiently addressed at the 
national level; the second was growing public concern about the environment, which led to 
the establishment in the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) at the Stockholm 
conference in 1972. The conference also identified chemical safety as a cross-cutting issue 
covering health, labor, and the environment. All sectors had a vital interest in chemicals, but 
operated in isolation. In 1977, WHO decided to set up an International Program on Chemical 
Safety (IPCS)—an inter-agency program between WHO, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), and UNEP for which WHO provided the secretariat and which started 
operations in 1980. The main role of the program was to develop international cooperative 
projects to strengthen capacity, particularly in developing countries to protect human health 
and the environment from toxic chemicals. The tripartite nature of the program reflected the 
cross-sectional nature of chemicals, with implications for public health (WHO), occupational 
health (ILO), and environmental health (UNEP).42 
Hence, in the years before IFCS was established, the key problem was that—despite existence 
of the IPCS—the chemical safety regime was fragmented, as individual UN entities had 
reverted to their own programs and paid lip service to coordination. Hence, a central agency 
with the mandate to address all related aspects of chemical safety and tight intergovernmental 
oversight was desirable. Indeed, there was a window of opportunity for an intergovernmental 
process when the report of the Brundtland Commission helped the issue break though high on 
the agenda of politicians before the upcoming UN Conference on the Environment (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. To advance this agenda, the WHO environmental health 
division organized a meeting of experts to discuss draft proposals for an Intergovernmental 
                                                          
41 http://www.who.int/ifcs/page2/en/. 
42 Interview #1. 
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Mechanism for Chemical Risk Assessment and Management (IMCRAM) in London in 
December 1992.43 
The proposed solution entailed an IGO covering all aspects of chemical management. This 
intergovernmental mechanism would produce legally-binding output and would be supported 
by a technical secretariat—essentially the existing IPCS at WHO, but with expanded 
functions and an associated budget. However, the institutional design that was eventually 
adopted differed from the IMCRAM proposal. In 1994, IFCS was established at a meeting 
hosted by the government of Sweden convening 114 countries, the executive heads of UNEP, 
ILO, and WHO, and non-governmental organizations. IFCS was a rather loose forum, where 
issues were debated but its resolutions remained non-legally binding. Further, IFCS did not 
have a technical secretariat, in the form of an expanded IPCS. However, the IFCS did follow 
the spirit of the IMCRAM proposal to incorporate a broad range of stakeholders in a 
transparent process of debate on a wide range of issues.44 Throughout its lifetime, IFCS 
developed institutional sub-structures to respond to ad-hoc needs, for example through 
regional groups, thematic working groups, and so-called ‘IFCS champions’—informal 
networks of participants tasked with the role of increasing awareness and promoting action 
related to the IFCS agenda.45 
IFCS proved instrumental for the creation of at least two UNEP conventions and other 
legally-binding agreements related to chemicals.46 For instance, IFCS facilitated the 
Stockholm convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), signed in 2001. The 
convention originated in a Canadian initiative in the UNEP General Council, which then 
asked IFCS to pursue the issue further in a multi-stakeholder approach. In 1998, IFCS held 
two back-to-back meetings, one with experts on POPs putting together a background 
document, and another one with a designated expert working group comprising national 
governments, regional organizations, and industry groups to discuss a potential framework for 
a convention. The resulting proposal was sent back to the UNEP General Council, which 
accepted it in its basic form, leading to the Stockholm convention.47 A similar division of 
labor occurred in the realm of the Minamata convention on mercury, for which IFCS provided 
a forum for discussion. Outside the remit of UNEP, the Globally Harmonized System for 
Classification and Labeling (GHS) provides another example.48 
                                                          
43 UNEP/IPCS/IMCRAM/exp/4. The proposal text was incorporated into the text for Chapter 19 of the Agenda 
21 (the resolution adopted at the Rio conference) dedicated to sound management of chemicals (although the 
issue of chemical waste was a separate chapter). 
44 Indeed, unlike the existing forums, IFCS had the remarkable feature of allowing all forum stakeholders to raise 
any issue related to chemical safety at any time. 
45 http://www.who.int/ifcs/champions/en/. 
46 Interview #1. 
47 Interview #2. 
48 States have been seeking internationally agreed-upon standards on hazardous materials and labeling schemes 
at the Rio Earth summit, but progress was slow, presumably because developing countries lacked the capacity to 
implement the standards. IFCS helped improve knowledge of health hazards related to chemicals and facilitated 
GHF training for developing countries through UNITAR (Interview #3). 
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Eventually, IFCS ceased to have an independent existence. In 2008, at its Sixth Forum 
Sessions in Dakar, it was decided to integrate IFCS as an advisory body into the International 
Conference for Chemicals Management (ICCM), performing the role of gathering critical 
knowledge and sharing relevant expertise for regulating health hazards.49 
Illustrating theories of institutional design 
The design of IFCS as a TGI is broadly consistent with functionalism. IFCS was useful for 
states as it was not constrained by legal formalities, especially regarding which types of issues 
could be discussed in the governing body. This allowed stakeholders to identify and act upon 
emergent cross-cutting issues, for instance nanotechnology. Furthermore, IFCS made it easier 
to involve all relevant stakeholders, thus holding promise to generate the required expert 
information and foster consensus more quickly. In this way, IFCS proved catalytic for 
subsequent legally-binding conventions. However, some design features of IFCS must appear 
puzzling to functionalists. In particular, the technical complexity of chemical safety would 
have warranted an independent secretariat, which was indeed proposed but eventually not 
adopted. 
A power-based approach can account for the lack of legal substance. Despite preference for a 
legally binding instrument among Nordic countries and environmental NGOs, the IMCRAM 
proposal was watered down following US pressure. As the most powerful stakeholder, the US 
asserted itself with its insistence on having no legally binding instrument and no technical 
secretariat financed by assessed contributions.50 
Domestic politics also contributed to the design of IFCS as a TGI. On the one hand, the 
prevention of a legally-binding mechanism was a major win for the chemical industry, which 
lobbied hard against the IMCRAM proposal.51 Conversely, chemical corporations were more 
supportive of the UNEP-promoted legally binding conventions because these targeted specific 
chemicals that they did no longer use and thus compliance with these conventions was 
costless to them.52 On the other hand, the flexible agenda-setting approach of IFCS was 
welcomed especially by NGOs and developing countries. The open-endedness of the 
discussions allowed these actors to bring up issues salient to them and build on deliberative 
dynamics to promote support coalitions. IFCS also allowed non-governmental actors to 
provide opinions at any time, in contrast to traditional IGOs where these actors were invited 
to provide factual comments after all governments had spoken. Furthermore, NGOs and 
developing countries felt that the requirement to make decisions by consensus put them in a 
more equal position vis-à-vis rich countries compared to traditional IGOs.53 
                                                          
49 Interview #1. 
50 Interviews #1, #2, and #3. 
51 Interview #1. 
52 Interview #3. 
53 Interview #2. Similarly, the IFCS website states, “[t]he IFCS provides countries the opportunity to place issues 
on the international agenda and emphasize special needs and concerns with respect to improving chemicals 
management. All participants, including developing countries and NGOs, find it a useful mechanism to bring 
emerging and contentious issues to the international agenda.” (http://www.who.int/ifcs/page2/en/). 
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A contextual design perspective can account for the remaining gaps in the explanation. While 
puzzling to functionalism, this view can explain why IFCS lacked a technical secretariat: the 
relevant technical expertise was already provided by the participating IGOs through their 
respective chemicals programs. The role of IFCS then was to bring new issues on the agenda, 
fostering consensus, and orchestrating policy action. It had no capacity for implementing 
policy resolutions but to that end relied on decentralized action. 
IFCS had to be created precisely because there was no open-ended coordination forum to deal 
with new upcoming issues in chemical management. For instance, the UNEP conventions—
dealing with specific chemicals—had strict limitations as to which issues could be brought on 
the agenda. The specific choice of a TGI was driven by the recognition that sound chemical 
management is a complex challenge that requires the involvement of multiple non-
governmental stakeholders—scientific experts, NGOs, and the chemical industry—for it to be 
effectively addressed.54 
The IFCS case demonstrates that states are motivated by the dual desire to establish 
governance mechanisms that are tailored to solve specific problems and to avoid task 
duplication in the regime by creating new organizations. States designed IFCS so that it 
would perform vital roles in the chemical safety regime—bringing all relevant stakeholders 
from multiple sectors and multiple organizations together and galvanizing action through ad-
hoc partnerships—while not duplicating existing functions. Especially the industrialized 
countries—as the ultimate donors of the organization—were adamant on avoiding duplication 
but conceived a need for a “think tank” to enable solutions and foster partnerships, with 
financing for chemical programs coming through bilateral projects and funding to WHO, 
UNEP, and ILO, earmarked for chemical safety.55 
 
7. Summary and conclusion 
The most significant trend in the recent history of the multilateral development system is the 
rapid growth of TGIs—partnerships between states, IGOs, and non-state actors to address 
global development challenges (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bull, Bøås, and McNeill 2004; 
Hale and Roger 2014). Dominated by Western governments, TGIs dominate the multilateral 
development system by their numbers alone, often directing the global policy responses in 
specific sub-sectors. 
In view of these trends, this article took on two important tasks. First, we documented the 
growth of TGIs in the development regime quantitatively, drawing on the new TGIWP data 
that collect information on the institutional features, policy mandates, and task profiles of 559 
development organizations (Westerwinter 2019c). Second, we juxtaposed four accounts for 
why states design cooperative endeavors as TGIs: functionalism, power-oriented theories, 
domestic politics, and context-sensitive design. Using the TGIWP dataset, we tested the 
                                                          
54 Interview #1. 
55 Interview #3. For a discussion of earmarked funding, particularly through trust funds, see, e.g., Reinsberg, 
Michaelowa, and Eichenauer (2015). 
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explanatory power of these four accounts under a common framework, considering that 
institutional design is a two-stage process involving an initial decision to create a new 
organization and a subsequent decision about its institutional design. We found that 
institutional choices can be well-explained jointly by all four design theories, while power-
oriented theories, functionalism, and contextual design received most robust support across 
various specifications. 
To further illustrate the quantitative findings, we conducted an in-depth case study of the 
IFCS—a TGI established in 1994 as a multi-stakeholder forum for discussing issues related to 
sound chemicals management and tasked with gathering critical knowledge and sharing 
relevant expertise for regulating health hazards. Because the statistical model predicted this 
case well, we found evidence for all four accounts of institutional design. The context-
sensitive design view, however, proved most useful in explaining critical design choices—the 
multi-stakeholder nature of the organization and its lack of an independent technical 
secretariat—which other accounts could not explain well. In addition, the case analysis 
revealed that informal governance—as reflected in the flexible agenda-setting approach of the 
IFCS Forum Sessions—worked to empower relatively powerless actors, such as developing 
countries, small countries from the North, and NGOs—given their perceived greater influence 
compared to a hypothetical IGO solution. Informal governance can thus empower NGOs and 
other weaker players (Avant and Westerwinter 2016). Because others suggest that it plays into 
the hands of the most powerful states (Steinberg 2002; Stone 2011), future research may need 
to explore conditions under which either effect holds. The analysis also revealed that the 
democratic qualities of an international organization benefit not only NGOs but also powerful 
business interests, given that the non-legally binding policy output was fully in line with the 
latter. By reducing the cost of influence for non-government actors, democracy thus favors 
actors with salient interests. 
Before discussing the broader implications of our article, we mention three limitations. First, 
since our unit of analysis is the international organization, our institutional design predictors 
are necessarily blunt. Results should therefore not be interpreted as a definitive test of 
individual theories but as an indication of their relative usefulness. Nonetheless, our 
qualitative case study indicated that the measures are valid, despite their level of aggregation. 
Second, while our methodological choices such as the selection model helped ensure internal 
validity, a remaining issue with the data is that they do not take interdependencies of 
institutions into account. Some organizations are successors of previous organizations that 
eventually failed, thereby violating the independence assumption in the data. While we 
suspect the amount of bias that such dependencies introduce to be negligible, future research 
should identify such cases and take them into account in the analysis. Third, another 
limitation is that the data do not allow for tracing dynamically evolving mandates of 
organizations. Future research should aim to fill this gap by collecting time-varying data on 
IGO mandates. 
Our findings have a number of implications for the social-scientific study of international 
organizations. First, the tremendous growth of TGIs over the past three decades suggests that 
examining only IGOs would be an incomplete—if not entirely misleading—representation of 
current global governance structures. However, the apparent decline of IGOs in development 
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cooperation does not imply that IGOs have become irrelevant. To the contrary, most 
development IGOs continue to perform key roles in new TGIs. Some IGOs provide essential 
technical inputs and implement TGI priorities, for example the WHO with respect to the 
Global Fund. Other IGOs perform orchestrator functions, for example the World Bank in the 
early phase of the Global Environment Facility (Graham and Thompson 2015). More 
generally, this raises new sets of questions as to which factors determine the design of inter-
organizational relations (Biermann and Koops 2017; Dijkstra 2017; Hanrieder 2015), notably 
the relationship between informal governance and the viability of IGOs. For instance, while 
TGIs as informal organizations may undermine the primacy of existing IGOs, the informal 
governance processes that they sustain may ultimately strengthen the IGOs by helping them 
to stay relevant in an interconnected world. 
Second, a methodological consequence of the growing importance of partnership-based forms 
of cooperation in global governance is that analytical leverage can be gained by capturing a 
regime-level perspective, which studies the interactions of various organizations working on a 
given issue (Biermann and Koops 2017; Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Gehring and Faude 
2014). States do not design new institutions in a vacuum but with a view to shape the entire 
regime (Henning 2017); defining features of a regime complex thus are the multiplicity of 
institutions, maintained by distinct forums with participation of different actors, and a relative 
lack of hierarchy among these institutions (Alter and Meunier 2009; Oberthür and Stokke 
2011; Raustiala and Victor 2004). A regime-level perspective on institutional design would 
privilege inferential network analysis approaches that are able to take spatial dependencies 
into account (Cranmer et al. 2017; Stadtfeld, Hollway, and Block 2017; Wang, Pattison, and 
Robins 2013). In the area of global governance, however, research that uses such methods is 
only in its infancy (Dietrich, Reinsberg, and Steinwand 2018; Westerwinter 2019b). 
Third, in addition to spatial interdependence, temporal dependence in international design is 
another key theme of our article. The rise of TGIs has implications for theories of institutional 
design (Copelovitch and Putnam 2014; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013; Koremenos, Lipson, 
and Snidal 2001; Rixen and Viola 2016). Consider the institutional design theory by Jupille, 
Mattli, and Snidal (2013), who conceive institutional design as a multi-step decision-making 
process in which states first screen the set of existing organizations to identify one they can 
use (or select one from several organizations); change an existing organization if no previous 
one meets their new demands; or, failing that, create a new organization, which is considered 
the most risky and most costly option and therefore rarely chosen. While this framework is 
analytically useful, it assumes that new organizations can only take the form of IGOs; but 
states can also design new TGIs, which can upset the whole decision-making sequence, 
depending on the costs of alternative institutional choices. Specifically, creating a TGI is less 
risky and less costly than creating an IGO; it may be even cheaper than changing an existing 
IGO. Thus, while the model proposed by Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal (2013) is analytically 
useful, their decision sequence ends at a point where important variation occurs, i.e. the 
choice of alternative forms of institutionalized cooperation that are different from IGOs. 
Exploring this interesting variation theoretically and empirically along and beyond their 
decision sequence is an important task for future research. 
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Fourth, the rise of TGIs also prompts reconsidering the debate on fragmentation as one of the 
purported perils of fast-growing global governance regimes (Abbott, Green, and Keohane 
2016; Acharya 2016a; Barnett, Pevehouse, and Raustiala 2016). Examining drivers of 
fragmentation, studies point to the growing number of actors and their growing diversity, 
including rising powers, private philanthropists, and IGO bureaucrats (Finnemore 2014; 
Johnson 2014; Reisen 2010). Whether or not fragmentation adversely affects effectiveness is 
a yet unresolved issue. Critics argue that fragmentation undermines the effectiveness of 
regimes to solve global problems; advocates of institutional plurality emphasize the merits of 
creativity (Acharya 2016b; De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel 2014; Henning 2017). While 
systematic analysis of TGI effectiveness is an issue for future research, the present article 
cautions against premature conclusions. Often vilified as “talking shops,” TGIs can be critical 
for the further development of the overall regime. For example, while the informal nature of 
IFCS might be seen as a major weakness, it proved instrumental for facilitating legally-
binding commitments in related venues. 
Finally, the rise of TGIs prompts debates about whether the state has lost its role in global 
politics at the expense of private actors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Büthe 2004; Hall 
and Biersteker 2002; Kahler and Lake 2003). Our analysis showed that states remain key 
actors but no longer are the only actors in institutional design. In the IFCS case, states 
controlled the organizational design decisions, as they watered down the IMCRAM proposal 
put forward by IGO bureaucrats. As others have shown, bureaucratic influence over 
organizational design thus is limited to cases where states have no salient interests; where 
they lack expertise; or where they are late to the process (Johnson 2014; Johnson and 
Urpelainen 2014; Seddon 2017). As a result of an increasingly crowded multilateral 
development system, however, states are ever less able to control the dynamic implications of 
TGI formation. Once created, TGIs push forward new issues, as non-state actors have great 
say in them by design. States thus risk being entrapped into escalating commitments. These 
dynamics would again be a fascinating area for future research beyond individual case 
studies. 
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Figures and tables 
Figure 1: Institutional creation in the multilateral development architecture. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the total number of new organizations created in each time period. 
 
 
41 
Table 1: Presence of design features across organizational types in the development regime. 
 Independent 
secretariat 
Voting 
mechanism 
Monitoring 
mechanism 
Enforcement 
mechanism 
Dispute 
settlement 
Average 
number of 
design features 
IGO 0.62 0.69 0.27 0.19 0.42 2.19 
IIGO 0.50 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.47 
TGI 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.74 
 0.41 0.41 0.18 0.11 0.21 1.22 
Notes: Column margins refer to specific design features over all organizations. Row margins refer to all organizations of the same type. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
Dependent variables 
     TGI 510 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Independent variables 
     Number of issues 559 1.02 0.49 0.00 2.30 
Member states 532 2.11 1.33 0.00 5.27 
Preference heterogeneity 447 1.88 1.44 0.00 4.98 
Power  424 26.38 2.45 18.60 30.53 
Power difference 365 27.45 2.70 18.44 30.56 
Polity IV 476 4.85 5.21 -9.50 10.00 
Polity IV difference 476 9.88 8.06 0.00 20.00 
Most-similar previous IO 498 0.78 0.14 0.31 1.00 
States in system 559 5.07 0.33 3.50 5.27 
System growth 559 2.41 0.73 0.69 3.81 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for a selection of variables. Please refer to the supplemental appendix for the full list of 
variables along with definitions and data sources. 
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Table 3: Arbitrating among different explanations of institutional design. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stage 1: Institutional creation 
    System growth 0.613*** 0.627*** 0.657*** 0.672*** 
 
(0.089) (0.105) (0.112) (0.137) 
Number of issues -2.068*** -4.903*** -2.249*** -3.456*** 
 
(0.170) (1.199) (0.199) (1.200) 
Member states 0.098 0.122 0.128* 0.166* 
 
(0.075) (0.081) (0.075) (0.095) 
Preference heterogeneity 0.265*** 0.304*** 0.255** 0.281** 
 
(0.093) (0.105) (0.108) (0.122) 
Power -0.106** -0.103** -0.080 -0.074 
 
(0.046) (0.052) (0.054) (0.063) 
Power difference -0.475*** -0.505*** -0.456*** -0.482*** 
 
(0.078) (0.100) (0.079) (0.103) 
Polity IV 0.024 0.016 0.018 0.007 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) 
Polity IV difference -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 -0.019 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
Most-similar previous IO -1.095 -1.579** -1.067 -1.529** 
 
(0.707) (0.689) (0.686) (0.643) 
Stage 2: TGI 
    Number of issues 0.006 0.040 0.010 0.038 
 
(0.058) (0.165) (0.080) (0.153) 
Member states -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.06*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Preference heterogeneity 0.058** 0.039* 0.046* 0.033 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
Power 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.042** 0.037* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Power difference 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.012 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) 
Polity IV 0.011** 0.009* 0.011** 0.010* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Polity IV difference 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Most-similar previous IO -0.316** -0.286* -0.464*** -0.445*** 
 
(0.150) (0.164) (0.142) (0.162) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue area dummies No Yes No Yes 
Governance task dummies No No Yes Yes 
N1 1216 1216 1173 1173 
N2 384 384 366 366 
Pseudo-R2 0.528 0.565 0.654 0.701 
t-value  0.841 -0.416 0.078 -0.508 
Bivariate probit regressions with robust standard errors. t-values refer to cross-equation correlations.  
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05   *** p<.01. 
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Supplemental appendix  
 
Figure A1: Evolution of the average formalization of international organizations. 
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Figure A2: Evolution of functional similarity with the organizational field. 
  
Notes: Both figures track the similarity of new entrants—separately for IGOs and TGIs—with all existing organizations. The left panel shows the maximum 
similarity with previous organizations based on issue-task combinations for all organizations founded in a given period. The right panel shows the average 
similarity with previous organizations based on issue-task combinations for all organizations established in the given period. 
The patterns in the left-hand panel appear to be consistent with the prevailing narrative of increased task duplication in the multilateral development system. For 
every new entrant, it has become significantly easier to find an organization that performs similar (if not the same) governance functions in a given issue area. 
However, the figure in the right-hand panel suggests that new organizations, and particularly new TGIs, have been established increasingly to fill particular 
organizational niches because they have become (on average) less alike than existing organizations. 
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Table A1: Alternative definition of dependent variable. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stage 1: Institutional creation 
    System growth 0.625*** 0.630*** 0.655*** 0.674*** 
 
(0.087) (0.104) (0.111) (0.133) 
Number of issues -2.102*** -4.822*** -2.266*** -3.432*** 
 
(0.168) (1.219) (0.202) (1.202) 
Member states 0.092 0.120 0.126* 0.167* 
 
(0.074) (0.081) (0.075) (0.094) 
Preference heterogeneity 0.268*** 0.309*** 0.253** 0.286** 
 
(0.095) (0.105) (0.108) (0.120) 
Power -0.106** -0.104** -0.082 -0.076 
 
(0.046) (0.052) (0.053) (0.062) 
Power difference -0.472*** -0.506*** -0.452*** -0.485*** 
 
(0.078) (0.100) (0.079) (0.101) 
Polity IV 0.026 0.016 0.019 0.008 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) 
Polity IV difference -0.002 -0.011 -0.012 -0.019 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
Most-similar previous IO -1.066 -1.595** -1.074 -1.527** 
 
(0.699) (0.681) (0.683) (0.654) 
Stage 2: TGI 
    Number of issues -0.074 0.255* -0.024 0.160 
 
(0.060) (0.140) (0.062) (0.138) 
Member states -0.074** -0.070*** -0.070** -0.068*** 
 
(0.033) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) 
Preference heterogeneity 0.040 0.027 0.037 0.026 
 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) 
Power 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.054** 0.046** 
 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
Power difference 0.020 0.010 0.019 0.012 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) 
Polity IV 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Polity IV difference -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Most-similar previous IO -0.220 -0.345** -0.436*** -0.503*** 
 
(0.154) (0.156) (0.148) (0.157) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue area dummies No Yes No Yes 
Governance task dummies No No Yes Yes 
N1 1216 1216 1173 1173 
N2 433 433 390 390 
Pseudo-R2 0.436 0.556 0.624 0.711 
t-value  -2.131** -0.911 -1.515 -0.543 
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Bivariate probit regressions for whether states created organization (Stage 1) and whether a created organization was a TGI 
(Stage 2). Covariates for organizations that never came into existence obtained through multiple imputation. Contrary to the 
main analysis, relevant comparisons in the second stage are made against any IGO or IIGO. 
Significance levels:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A2: Sequential analysis of design determinants with fixed effects. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stage 1: Institutional creation 
    System growth 0.613*** 0.592*** 0.594*** 0.587*** 
 
(0.100) (0.137) (0.106) (0.104) 
Number of issues -3.725*** 
   
 
(0.953) 
   Member states 0.131* 
   
 
(0.074) 
   Preference heterogeneity -0.075* 
   
 
(0.045) 
   Power 
 
-0.080 
  
  
(0.051) 
  Power difference 
 
-0.339*** 
  
  
(0.060) 
  Polity IV 
  
-0.035*** 
 
   
(0.013) 
 Polity IV difference 
  
-0.003 
 
   
(0.009) 
 Most-similar previous IO 
   
-1.105*** 
    
(0.413) 
Stage 2: TGI 
    Number of issues 0.017 
   
 
(0.147) 
   Member states -0.110*** 
   
 
(0.021) 
   Preference heterogeneity 0.058*** 
   
 
(0.015) 
   Power 
 
0.066*** 
  
  
(0.017) 
  Power difference 
 
0.011 
  
  
(0.015) 
  Polity IV 
  
0.016*** 
 
   
(0.004) 
 Polity IV difference 
  
-0.001 
 
   
(0.002) 
 Most-similar previous IO 
   
-0.409*** 
    
(0.127) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance task dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N1 1491 1173 1491 1491 
N2 483 366 483 483 
ll 446.46 305.41 480.76 489.99 
t -0.86 -1.30 -0.20 0.33 
Bivariate probit regressions for whether states created organization (Stage 1) and whether a created organization was a TGI 
(Stage 2). Covariates for organizations that never came into existence obtained through multiple imputation. Relevant 
comparisons in the second stage are made against any IGO. 
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Significance levels:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A3: Sequential analysis of design determinants with fixed effects. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stage 1: Institutional creation 
    System growth 0.616*** 0.598*** 0.595*** 0.586*** 
 
(0.101) (0.135) (0.106) (0.105) 
Number of issues -3.711*** 
   
 
(0.962) 
   Member states 0.134* 
   
 
(0.073) 
   Preference heterogeneity -0.073 
   
 
(0.046) 
   Power 
 
-0.084 
  
  
(0.051) 
  Power difference 
 
-0.34*** 
  
  
(0.061) 
  Polity IV 
  
-0.036*** 
 
   
(0.013) 
 Polity IV difference 
  
-0.003 
 
   
(0.009) 
 Most-similar previous IO 
   
-1.106*** 
    
(0.414) 
Stage 2: TGI 
    Number of issues 0.149 
   
 
(0.137) 
   Member states -0.118*** 
   
 
(0.026) 
   Preference heterogeneity 0.052*** 
   
 
(0.017) 
   Power 
 
0.079*** 
  
  
(0.017) 
  Power difference 
 
0.007 
  
  
(0.015) 
  Polity IV 
  
0.016*** 
 
   
(0.004) 
 Polity IV difference 
  
-0.003 
 
   
(0.002) 
 Most-similar previous IO 
   
-0.466*** 
    
(0.127) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance task dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N1 1491 1173 1491 1491 
N2 507 390 507 507 
ll 480.538 329.996 515.878 527.229 
t -0.085 -1.473 -0.327 0.276 
Bivariate probit regressions for whether states created organization (Stage 1) and whether a created organization was a TGI 
(Stage 2). Covariates for organizations that never came into existence obtained through multiple imputation. Relevant 
comparisons in the second stage are made against any IGO or IIGO. 
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Significance levels:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4: Sequential analysis of design determinants with continuous dependent variable. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stage 1: Institutional creation 
    System growth 0.618*** 0.612*** 0.599*** 0.593*** 
 
(0.101) (0.132) (0.107) (0.105) 
Number of issues -3.709*** 
   
 
(0.958) 
   Member states 0.133* 
   
 
(0.072) 
   Preference heterogeneity -0.073 
   
 
(0.046) 
   Power 
 
-0.080 
  
  
(0.052) 
  Power difference 
 
-0.341*** 
  
  
(0.061) 
  Polity IV 
  
-0.035*** 
 
   
(0.013) 
 Polity IV difference 
  
-0.002 
 
   
(0.009) 
 Most-similar previous IO 
   
-1.107*** 
    
(0.413) 
Stage 2: TGI 
    Number of issues 0.812** 
   
 
(0.386) 
   Member states 0.176** 
   
 
(0.077) 
   Preference heterogeneity -0.040 
   
 
(0.061) 
   Power 
 
-0.090 
  
  
(0.077) 
  Power difference 
 
0.020 
  
  
(0.066) 
  Polity IV 
  
0.001 
 
   
(0.016) 
 Polity IV difference 
  
0.024*** 
 
   
(0.008) 
 Most-similar previous IO 
   
1.786*** 
    
(0.471) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance task dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N1 1491 1173 1491 1491 
N2 507 390 507 507 
ll 1160.23 850.10 1184.81 1185.40 
t -0.65 -1.21 -1.89* -2.69*** 
Bivariate probit regressions for whether states created organization (Stage 1) and an index of organizational structure (Stage 
2). Signs of covariates must be reversed to support the theory. Covariates for organizations that never came into existence 
obtained through multiple imputation.  
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Significance levels:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A5: Alternative way of generating unobserved organizations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stage 2: TGI 
    Number of issues -0.143*** 0.173 -0.079 0.117 
 
(0.048) (0.136) (0.049) (0.127) 
Member states -0.081*** -0.068*** -0.085*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Preference heterogeneity 0.049** 0.028 0.047** 0.027 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.02) 
Power 0.054** 0.05** 0.038* 0.034 
 
(0.021) (0.02) (0.022) (0.021) 
Power difference 0.013 0.007 0.016 0.012 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Polity IV 0.011** 0.009* 0.011** 0.01* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Polity IV difference -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Most-similar previous IO -0.188 -0.319** -0.473*** -0.557*** 
 
(0.166) (0.151) (0.159) (0.15) 
Observations 430 430 389 389 
R-squared 0.528 0.565 0.654 0.701 
Cross-correlation 2.296** 1.695* 1.137 0.321 
Issue area dummies No Yes No Yes 
Task dummies No No Yes Yes 
Bivariate probit regressions for whether states created organization (Stage 1—not shown) and whether an organization was 
a TGI (Stage 2). First stage omitted in the table because by construction the coefficients are insignificant because 
organizations with the same features simultaneously do exist (in the design they were created) and do not exist (in the 
design in which they were not created).  
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
55 
Table A6: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Definition and sources Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
Dependent variable       
TGI 1 if TGI. In the main analysis, the relevant comparison is against IGOs; for 
robustness tests, the comparison is against IGOs or IIGOs (for which the 
mean is lower but the other statistics are similar) 
510 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Organizational structure Number of structural features: secretariat, voting provision, monitoring 
mechanism, enforcement mechanism, dispute settlement 
559 1.39 1.37 0.00 5.00 
Key predictors       
Number of issues Natural logarithm of the number of issues in which a given organization is 
active. 
559 1.02 0.49 0.00 2.30 
Member states Natural logarithm of the number of member states of a given organization. 532 2.11 1.33 0.00 5.27 
Preference heterogeneity Maximum difference in the ideal point difference (based on UNGA voting 
patterns) across the member states of an organization. 
447 1.88 1.44 0.00 4.98 
Power  Natural logarithm of the average GDP across the member states of an 
organization. 
424 26.38 2.45 18.60 30.53 
Power difference Natural logarithm of the difference in GDP between the largest member and 
the smallest member of an organization. 
365 27.45 2.70 18.44 30.56 
Polity IV Average Polity IV index across the member states of an organization. 476 4.85 5.21 -9.50 10.00 
Polity IV difference Difference in Polity IV index between the most democratic member and the 
most autocratic member of an organization. 
476 9.88 8.06 0.00 20.00 
Most-similar previous IO Most-similar previous organization is computed with data available from the 
TGIWP and original coding for this article of issue areas and task profiles for 
non-TGIs as follows. First, for each organization, the set of previous 
organizations is identified and their respective profiles for issue areas and 
governance tasks extracted. Second, the cosine similarity between any two 
profiles (corresponding to each pair of the given organization and a previous 
organization) for both issue areas and governance task is computed and both 
values multiplied with each other. Third, the maximum value over all pairs is 
498 0.78 0.14 0.31 1.00 
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identified.   
States in system Natural logarithm of the number of states in the international system. 559 5.07 0.33 3.50 5.27 
System growth Natural logarithm of the number of new (other) organizations created in the 
foundation year of a given organization. 
559 2.41 0.73 0.69 3.81 
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Appendix B: List of interviews. 
 
#1 Senior Special Fellow and Training Adviser at UNITAR 
May 20, 2016 
#2 Former Executive Secretary of IFCS 
May 25, 2018 
#3 Former staff member, UNITAR, Chemicals and Waste Management Program 
May 25, 2018 
 
 
 
